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INTRODUCTION
No jury has ever heard all the facts in this case including its most shameful
aspect: doctors and lawyers conspired to conceal medical negligence and to deprive
Shelly Hipwell, a brain-damaged coma patient, of legal representation and compensation
for her catastrophic injuries.
The Trial Court has consistently refused to permit Plaintiffs to present any
evidence of fraudulent concealment, even in the bifurcated 1999 statute of limitations
trial where the admissibility of concealment was obvious. In 2000, the trial court
dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud claims with no evidentiary hearing.

At the 2001 medical negligence trial, the trial court refused to allow both
evidence of concealment and the opinion of the Plaintiffs' expert on the key negligence
components of Plaintiffs' case (and instructed the jury that Defendant IHC was not
negligent).
In the 2001 trial, the jury should have been permitted to hear about the
conspiracy that Dr. Healy orchestrated on his own behalf and on behalf of IHC and which
IHC joined to conceal the medical malpractice of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. The jury
also should have been permitted to hear the opinion of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. DeVore, that
McKay-Dee's emergency room was clearly negligent in failing to immediately refer
Shelly to an obstetrician (instead merely sending her home with Tylenol when she was
obviously suffering from severe preeclampsia).
The Hipwells are entirely willing to live with the verdict of a jury that is
permitted to hear their entire case. After all these many years, the Hipwells should
finally be permitted to present their entire case to the jury and let the jury decide whether
Shelly died as a result of negligence of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee.

ARGUMENT

A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FRAUD
CLAIMS.

2

1. The Jensen Court Did Not Dismiss the Hipwells' Fraud Claims,
Dr. Healy insists that in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327 (Utah
1997), the Hipwells' fraud claims were dismissed because the Jensen court supposedly
found that the Hipwells only had a claim for medical malpractice that was fraudulently
concealed, and did not have an independent fraud claim. This argument fundamentally
misconstrues and ignores important language and the basic rationale of the Jensen
decision.
The issue that the Jensen court faced was whether the three-year common law
fraud statute of limitations or the two-year Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations
governed the Hipwells' fraud claims. The Jensen court recognized that both of these
statutes applied on their face to the Hipwells' fraud claims. The Jensen court stated that
the medical malpractice statute of limitations and its fraudulent concealment doctrine
"applies to every 'malpractice action against a health care provider'" and applied the
"settled rule of statutory construction" that "a more specific statute governs instead of a
more general statute." [944 P.2d at 336] The court opined:
Thus, the Medical Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations
applies to cases of fraudulent concealment arising out of medical
malpractice.
In contrast, the three-year fraud statute of limitations, §78-1226, applies to any action "for relief on the ground of fraud." The
fraud statute of limitations is thus far broader than the Medical
Malpractice Act, and our rules of statutory construction provide
that the more specific medical malpractice applies instead of the
more general fraud statute of limitations. [Id.]

3

If the Hipwells had no independent fraud claims, the common law fraud statute of
limitations could not have applied to their claims and the court's analysis would have
been unnecessary.
Dr. Healy mistakenly relies upon the following language to support his
interpretation of Jensen:
While we acknowledge that there may be cases where a doctor
commits fraud on a patient in a way that would not be covered by
the Medical Malpractice Act's fraudulent concealment provision,
this is not such a case. Given the specific facts alleged in this case,
we cannot agree that Shelly's family's fraud claim amounts to
anything more than or is different from a claim of fraudulent
concealment of medical malpractice.
This language does not at all support Dr. Healy's position. All the Jensen
court was saying in this passage is that because the fraud claims made by the Hipwells
were for fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice they were governed by the more
specific Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations rather than the general common
law fraud statute of limitations. If the Jensen court had been of the opinion that the
Hipwells had no common law claim for fraudulent concealment, the court certainly
would have said so and would have ruled that the three-year common law fraud statute of
limitations did not apply because no common law fraud claim existed. The court would
not have bothered to decide which fraud statute of limitations should be applied.
Instead of rejecting the common law fraud claims, the Jensen court
specifically ruled that those common law fraud claims were governed by the two-year
medical malpractice statute of limitations:
4

Finally, we hold that Shelly's family's claims for common law
fraud are also governed by the two-year medical malpractice
statute of limitations found in §78-14-4
[944 P.2d at 337]
If the Hipwells had no common law fraud claims, it would have been nonsensical for the
Jensen court to rule that nonexistent claims were governed by the two-year statute of
limitations.
Dr. Healy also points to some dicta contained in the first paragraph of the
Jensen court's opinion on the petition for rehearing in which Justice Zimmerman was
very cursorily "setting the table" to discuss the issues raised on rehearing:
We further held that Jensen and Hipwell's attempt to
recharacterize their medical malpractice wrongful death claim as a
claim for fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations. [944 P.2d at 337]
Notably, Justice Zimmerman did not state in this passage that the court had
dismissed the fraud claims. Apparently, all Justice Zimmerman meant by this language
was that the court had determined that the Hipwells' assertion of fraud was not sufficient
to avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations for the reason stated in
the original opinion, i.e., that a cause of action for fraudulent concealment of medical
malpractice is governed by the two-year statute rather than the three-year common law
fraud statute. In any event, this rather cryptic dicta cannot overcome the clear rationale
and language of the original opinion which clearly recognized the existence of the
Hipwells' fraud claims and determined they were governed by the two-year statute of

5

limitations. The rehearing opinion did not purport to revisit or modify the original
opinion in this regard.
2. The Hipwells Were Damaged by the Fraudulent Concealment
Dr. Healy also incorrectly asserts that the Hipwells could not have suffered
any damages as a result of the fraudulent concealment because the concealment was
discovered and there is no cause of action for attempted fraud. This argument ignores
Hipwells' evidence.
First, the Hipwells were damaged because part of the fraudulent concealment
was the dumping of Shelly by transferring her to the University Hospital on the pretext
that she may have necrotizing fasciitis. The conduct of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in
dumping Shelly on the University Hospital put her in harms way. But for that dumping,
Shelly's heart would not have been punctured by the resident physician at the University
Hospital. Dr. Healy and IHC are liable for all of the harm caused by their negligence and
fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., Holden v. Balko, 949 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ind. 1996);
Carmichael v. Bellen 914 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Okla. 1996).
Second, as a result of the fraudulent concealment, the Hipwells were required
to litigate the statute of limitations issue with Dr. Healy and IHC for several years,
including engaging in substantial discovery, defending a summary judgment motion,
prosecuting a successful appeal on the statute of limitations issue and finally bearing the
cost and expense of a separate trial on the statute of limitations at which the Hipwells
prevailed. A jury could well find that had Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee not acted to
6

fraudulently conceal their malpractice, the Hipwells would have filed their claims well
before the statute of limitations expired and would not have had to litigate for several
years the issues of when the malpractice was, or should have been, discovered that were
infused into the case because of the fraudulent concealment.
3. The Fraud Claims Are Not Moot
Dr. Healy and IHC next contend that the fraud claims are now moot because
the jury has rendered a verdict that the Defendants were not negligent. The problem with
this argument is fundamental. The jury reached its decision without having the benefit of
all of the evidence bearing on negligence.
First, the jury was not permitted to hear evidence concerning the negligence of
McKay-Dee's emergency room which, as explained at length in Appellants' Brief and
below, not only prevented the Hipwells from having the jury determine the negligence of
the emergency room, but could very well have impacted the jury's determination with
respect to the other negligence claims that the jury was permitted to consider.
Second, the jury was not permitted to hear the evidence concerning the
fraudulent concealment of the negligence of Dr. Healy and IHC. This evidence could
have had a very substantial impact on the jury's opinion of the credibility of Dr. Healy
and Dr. Baughman when they testified they believed their care of Shelly had been
perfectly proper and when Dr. Healy testified he had no knowledge of Shelly's treatment
in the emergency room.

7

The Hipwells should be permitted to present to the jury all of the evidence of
medical malpractice and fraudulent concealment and then have the jury determine those
claims. Because the case should be remanded for a new trial on the negligence claims,
the fraudulent concealment of the alleged negligence is not moot.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIPWELLS LEAVE
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT,
The only argument asserted by Dr. Healy and IHC to justify the district
court's refusal to allow the Hipwells to file their Fourth Amended Complaint to allege a
privity or agency relationship between Dr. Healy and IHC is that amendment would have
been futile because the Jensen court had already dismissed the fraud claims. As
demonstrated above, Jensen did not dismiss the fraud claims, but instead confirmed the
existence of those claims. Thus, it was clear error for the district court to deny leave to
amend where the motion to amend was timely made prior to the deadline set by the
district court for amending pleadings and Dr. Healy and IHC neither alleged nor
established any prejudice.

C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE OF DR. HEALY AND IHC,

8

Dr. Healy's argument that the district court properly excluded evidence of
fraudulent concealment of the alleged medical malpractice is a study in contrast. On the
one hand, Dr. Healy ignores important evidence, isolates each piece of remaining
evidence and gives that evidence the most innocent interpretation possible, and argues
that by no stretch of the imagination could the evidence demonstrate Dr. Healy engaged
in a coverup.1 On the other hand, Dr. Healy justifies the exclusion of this evidence under
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence on the ground that the evidence would have been
extremely prejudicial and would have confused and misled the jury.
However, it was for the jury to determine what weight to give to the coverup
evidence and what inferences to draw from that evidence. If the jury agreed with Dr.
Healy that this evidence was innocuous, the evidence could not have prejudiced Dr.
Healy and IHC or confused or misled the jury. On the other hand, if the jury agreed with
the Hipwells that the evidence demonstrated a concerted effort by Dr. Healy and IHC to
cover up the alleged medical malpractice, then the evidence was highly relevant to show
an awareness on their part that malpractice had been committed despite their protestations
to the contrary.

1

For example, Dr. Healy argues it was "entirely natural and innocent" for him to discuss
the tragic events with his attorney brother. [Dr. Healy Brief, pp. 32-32] That is an inference Dr.
Healy was free to argue to the jury. However, the jury could also have inferred from the timing
and content of that conversation and the fact that Attorney Healy became secretly involved in the
representation of Shelly, that this dinner meeting was the beginning of Dr. Healy's effort to
conceal.
9

It is improper to view each piece of fraudulent conduct evidence in isolation.
The evidence must be viewed as a whole in determining whether a jury could reasonably
have concluded that Dr. Healy and IHC fraudulently concealed the alleged negligence.
Shelly went to the emergency room at McKay-Dee early in the morning of
December 12, 1988, complaining of severe pains that she had been experiencing for
several hours. According to the Hipwells' expert, Dr. Gregory DeVore, ("Dr. DeVore"),
Shelly was suffering from severe preeclampsia at the time and the emergency room
should have immediately referred her to an obstetrician for appropriate treatment and
immediate delivery of her baby rather than sending her home with Tylenol. When Dr.
DeVore was consulted on December 13, he immediately sent Shelly to labor and
delivery. It was Dr. DeVore's opinion that had Shelly been delivered earlier, the severe
complications that she suffered could have been avoided.
After delivery, Shelly suffered serious complications on December 14, but Dr.
Healy and McKay-Dee allowed her to bleed internally for hours before finally obtaining
a surgical consultation from Dr. Alder who quickly diagnosed a probable ruptured liver
and performed immediate surgery by which time Shelly had lost approximately 60% of
her blood volume into her distended abdomen. [See Appellants' Brief, SOF Nos. 1-9]
Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman then caused Shelly to be transferred to the
University Hospital on the pretext that she may have necrotizing fasciitis even though
either McKay-Dee or L.D.S. Hospital could have treated that condition and even though
Dr. Alder had opined - - and the tests proved - - that Shelly did not have the lethal form
10

of necrotizing fasciitis about which the doctors were allegedly concerned. In fact, the day
Shelly arrived at the University Hospital it was determined she did not have that
condition. Despite this fact, Dr. Healy and IHC made no attempt to return Shelly to the
IHC system. [Appellants' Brief, SOF Nos. 14-15]
When Shelly's heart was punctured at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy
recognized he was a potential Defendant in her negligence claim and within two days met
with his brother, Attorney Healy, and discussed Shelly's medical negligence case with
him in depth. Shortly thereafter, Attorney Healy discussed the matter with the Healys'
sister, Diane Devries ("Devries"), who was Dr. Healy's file clerk and the Relief Society
President in the Hipwells' L.D.S. ward. As a result of this contact, Roger Sharp was
retained to represent the Hipwells and Attorney Healy was secretly associated as cocounsel to receive 40% of the fee.
Shortly thereafter, Attorney Healy wrote his February 13, 1989 letter to Roger
Sharp essentially confirming that there would be no real investigation of Dr. Healy's care
of Shelly and that the claim should be settled without litigation. When Sharp then asked
for Dr. Healy's file, Attorney Healy assured him the request was routine and Dr. Healy
withheld significant portions of the file.
Finally, in order to facilitate a quick settlement without the necessity of
litigation, Dr. Healy opined to his brother that Shelly would probably die very soon,
knowing that this information would be used by the lawyers as an excuse to settle
Shelly's case quickly and cheaply.
11

A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that Dr. Healy conspired
with his brother, Attorney Healy, and his sister, Devries, and Sharp to have Sharp and
Attorney Healy retained to represent the Hipwells so there would be no real investigation
of Dr. Healy's care of Shelly, and to avoid extensive litigation in which that care may
come under close scrutiny. A jury could reasonably conclude that Dr. Healy was acting
as an agent of or was in privity with IHC in orchestrating the coverup and that IHC joined
the concealment effort when Shelly was transferred to the University Hospital on a
pretext to avoid discovery of McKay-Dee's emergency room negligence and the
negligence in allowing Shelly to bleed internally for several hours before repairing her
ruptured liver.
The Hipwells are entitled to have their entire case presented to the jury and
then let the jury determine whether Dr. Healy and IHC were negligent and whether they
are guilty of fraudulent concealment. By excluding the fraudulent concealment evidence,
the district court improperly amputated an important part of the Hipwells' case and
prevented the jury from fully considering the merits of this case.
Dr. Healy argues that this coverup evidence would only be admissible if it was
"clear and unequivocally inconsistent with innocence." [Dr. Healy Brief, p. 32] Dr.
Healy is unable to cite any case that supports that strict standard. To the contrary, if the
jury could reasonably infer that the conduct of Dr. Healy and IHC demonstrated an
awareness that they had negligently treated Shelly, that is all that is required to make this
evidence relevant. It is for a jury to weigh and determine the meaning of conflicting
12

evidence. Alternative explanations for conduct alleged to show an awareness of guilt "go
to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence." State v. Hokate, 10 P.3d
346, 353-354 (Utah 2000); Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Alas. 1983); People v.
Perry, 499 P.2d 129, 139 (Cal. 1972).
The Hipwells were entitled to prove a conspiracy through circumstantial
evidence and the existence of a tacit understanding on the object to be accomplished,
based upon the conduct of those participating in the conspiracy and their interests. Thus,
in Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah App. 1987), the court
observed:
There is no direct evidence in the record of a meeting of the
parties' minds with respect to defrauding Pagan of his property.
However, it is not necessary in a civil conspiracy action to prove
that the parties actually came together and entered into a formal
agreement to do the acts complained of by direct evidence.
Instead, conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
including the nature of the act done, the relations of the parties and
the interests of the alleged conspirators. To prove conspiracy to
defraud by circumstantial evidence, though, "there must be
substantial proof of circumstances from which it reasonably
follows, or at least may be reasonably inferred, that the conspiracy
existed. It cannot be established by conjecture and speculation
alone." [Citations Omitted]
See also. Holmes v. McKay, 383 P.2d 655, 665 (Okla. 1963); Chicago Title Insurance
Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 44 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. 1968).
Dr. Healy argues that before statements made by one Defendant against
another may be admitted under the co-conspirator exception the Hipwells were required
to prove the existence of the conspiracy by independent proof and by a preponderance of
13

the evidence. Dr. Healy argues that the Hipwells failed to do so and the trial court never
determined the existence of a conspiracy. Of course, the short answer to this argument is
that the Hipwells attempted to prove the conspiracy, and the evidence set forth above is
certainly sufficient from which a jury could have determined a conspiracy existed, but the
trial court at the urging of Dr. Healy and IHC would not permit the jury to hear the
conspiracy evidence.2
Although Dr. Healy insists that the conduct of Dr. Healy and IHC was
innocent, he further argues that the district court was justified in excluding that evidence
because of possible prejudice and confusion of the issues under Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
Understandably, neither the district court nor Dr. Healy have been able to
particularize what unfair prejudice this evidence may have engendered. If the evidence
was innocuous, as Dr. Healy and IHC proclaim, then the evidence would not have been
prejudicial at all. On the other hand, if the jury agreed with the Hipwells that this
evidence demonstrated an awareness that negligence had been committed, the evidence
would have been highly relevant to whether Dr. Healy and IHC had committed
malpractice. Although in that event the evidence would have been prejudicial in the
sense that it would have hurt Dr. Healy and IHCs case, the evidence would not have

2

Dr. Healy erroneously argues that the conspiracy was not presented to the court below
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This is incorrect. The conspiracy was raised as
early as the Hipwells' Second Amended Complaint filed in 1993 and in opposition to Defendants'
summary judgment motion in 1994. [See, e^g., R. 264-265; 905-907]
14

been unfairly prejudicial. There is no basis for any argument that the evidence may have
led the jury to decide the negligence issue on an improper basis, which is what is required
to show unfair prejudice. In order for the district court to properly exclude the
concealment evidence on the ground of prejudice, Dr. Healy and IHC were required to
show that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of
the evidence. See, e ^ , United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001). They
failed to do so.3 The district court, therefore, abused its discretion in excluding this
evidence. See, e ^ , State v. Mitchell 571 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Utah 1997).
Dr. Healy also mistakenly suggests that the Hipwells have waived any right to
challenge the district court's exclusion of the fraudulent concealment evidence on
relevancy grounds under Rule 402. [Dr. Healy Brief, p. 37] The district court in fact
grounded its decision on Rule 403. [R. 508 at 1257-59] However, it is disingenuous to
suggest that the Hipwells failed to argue that this fraudulent concealment evidence was
relevant. The entire thrust of the Hipwells' argument in Appellants' Brief was that this
evidence was highly relevant and there was no unfair prejudice that substantially
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. [See Appellants' Brief, pp. 38-43]

3

Dr. Healy tells the court that the coverup could not have been proven without witnesses
that the Hipwells did not name on their witness list - - Attorney Healy, Sharp and Devries. This
argument is surprising given the fact that these witnesses were in fact on the Hipwells' witness list
[R 2944-2945] and Dr. Healy and IHC moved to exclude them as witnesses on the basis that no
evidence of the fraudulent concealment could be presented. [R. 3265-3267]
15

Dr. Healy next argues that the Hipwells have waived any right to challenge the
district court's conclusion that the evidence would cause confusion to the jury. [Dr. Healy
Brief, p. 37] However, the Hipwells expressly argued that it was improper for the district
court to exclude the evidence under Rule 403, which includes exclusion on the basis of
confusion of the issues. The fact that the Hipwells refer generically in their brief to
"unfair prejudice" rather than separately referring to "confusion of the issues" does not
constitute a waiver of this argument.
Again, neither the district court nor Dr. Healy and IHC have been able to
explain how this evidence could confuse the issues other than Dr. Healy's conclusory
insistence that "the Hipwells hoped to confuse the medical issues with far-fetched and
attenuated allegations of concealment." [Dr. Healy Brief, p. 38] Evidence that Dr. Healy
and IHC acted to cover up their negligence would hardly confuse the issue of whether
they were guilty of negligence. Of course, the court's jury instructions would have
instructed the jury to the effect that they were to consider this evidence solely on the
issue of whether it demonstrated Dr. Healy and/or IHC had a consciousness that they
were guilty of negligence (because the court had wrongly dismissed the fraud claims).
Finally, Dr. Healy argues that the district court correctly excluded this
evidence because evidence of Dr. Healy's conduct could have unfairly prejudiced or
confused the jury with respect to IHC. That is no more true than in any case where
multiple defendants are involved and evidence of one defendant's conduct does not
necessarily implicate another defendant. If the evidence only demonstrated that Dr.
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Healy fraudulently concealed the alleged negligence (which the Hipwells dispute), then
an appropriate limiting instruction could have been given and IHC was free to argue that
to the jury. On the other hand, the jury could well have believed Dr. Healy was acting as
the agent of or in privity with IHC and that IHC joined in the fraudulent concealment
when it transferred Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital on a pretext.
In any event, any danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues
certainly did not substantially outweigh the probativeness of this evidence.

D. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN EXCLUDING
PR, DEVORE'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE EMERGENCY ROOM
NEGLIGENCE,
Dr. Healy and IHC contend in their briefs that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding Dr. DeVore's testimony concerning the emergency room
negligence because Dr. DeVore was not an emergency room physician, had not practiced
in the emergency room for more than twenty years when the specialty of emergency room
physician did not exist, that he subscribed to no literature and took no courses in
emergency medicine, and had no knowledge concerning guidelines for liver function tests
at the McKay-Dee emergency room.4 What Dr. Healy and IHC fail to address is the

4

IHC cites Franklin v. The Public Health Trust, 759 So.2d 703, 705 (Fla. App. 2000), for
the holding that a physician was not qualified to testify concerning emergency room negligence
where he had not provided emergency room services in a hospital emergency room within the
preceding five years. However, this holding was based on a specific Florida statute requiring such
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qualifications which Dr. DeVore did undeniably possess and which qualified him to
testify as an expert on the emergency room standard of care in this case.
Dr. DeVore specialized in maternal fetal medicine and high risk pregnancies.
Preeclampsia and HELP syndrome are complications of high risk pregnancy and can only
be suffered by pregnant women. Dr. DeVore testified that he was fully familiar with
emergency room procedures in the various hospitals at which he had worked with respect
to the handling and treatment of obstetric patients. Dr. DeVore testified that the standard
of care was uniform in the hospitals at which he had worked and that he was familiar
with the standard of care for emergency room care of a third trimester obstetrical patient
such as Shelly. Most importantly. Dr. DeVore testified without contradiction that he was
aware of IHC's policies and procedures with respect to such obstetrical patients during
December of 1988. Dr. DeVore was the Director of Maternal Fetal Medicine for IHC at
the time. In fact Dr. DeVore trained IHC physicians at the IHC hospital emergency
rooms as to the standard of care when a third trimester obstetric patient with Shelly's
symptoms presented to the emergency room.
Dr. DeVore was fully competent to testify that an emergency room physician
was not qualified to treat Shelly's symptoms and that the standard of care required that
the emergency room physician immediately consult with an obstetrician and have the
obstetrician treat Shelly. [R. 5004 at pp. 276-281; R. 288-301 and 416-441] Because the

experience before admitting expert testimony. The case is, therefore, not on point.
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standard of care required the emergency room physician to immediately refer Shelly to an
obstetrician for treatment, Dr. DeVore was fully qualified to testify that the standard of
care was breached.
In Appellants' Brief, the Hipwells argued that Judge Iwasaki had ruled prior to
the trial that Dr. DeVore could testify as to the breach of the standard of care by the
emergency room physician, but then reversed his decision at trial. IHC argues that this
claim is "disingenuous" because prior to trial the district court had ruled that absent
further foundation Dr. DeVore could not testify concerning Shelly's treatment in the
emergency room "during triage stages, specifically, prior to her being diagnosed as
needing obstetric care." [IHC Brief, p. 24]
This argument is misleading because all Judge Iwasaki precluded by this
ruling was testimony concerning general emergency room procedures prior to the time
that Shelly was diagnosed as needing obstetric care. When Shelly appeared in the
emergency room in the third trimester of her pregnancy with severe abdominal pains, the
standard of care required that she be immediately referred to an obstetrician. It is that
testimony that was allowed under Judge Iwasaki's original ruling and then excluded when
Judge Iwasaki changed his mind during trial.
IHC argues that Dr. DeVore had no business attempting to testify that an
emergency room physician should have been able to diagnose Shelly's rare condition and
refer her to an obstetrician. [IHC Brief, p. 27]
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This argument ignores the fact that the standard of care required that the
emergency room physician not attempt to diagnose Shelly, but instead to immediately
refer her to an obstetrician for specific diagnosis and treatment.
IHC also argues that the Hipwells "have failed to show that admission of Dr.
DeVore's emergency testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial." [IHC
Brief, p. 28] IHC argues that the emergency room physician conducted extensive testing
and found no indication of significant disease and did direct Shelly to follow up with her
physician the next day and that there was evidence that delivery one day sooner would
not have affected Shelly's outcome.
However, all the Hipwells are required to show to prove harmful error is that
absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the
Hipwells. See, State v. Dunn. 350 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). IHC's argument
ignores Dr. DeVore's testimony that the standard of care required that Shelly be delivered
at the time of the emergency room visit on December 12 or that morning because her
symptoms were hallmarks for severe preeclampsia and that Shelly's severe complications
could have been avoided had she been delivered timely. [R5004 at 422-423 and 444-447]
If the jury been given the rest of the story, and if Dr. DeVore's testimony had
been admitted, there was certainly a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have ruled
in favor of the Hipwells on their emergency room negligence claim and the other
negligence claims.
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IHC further argues that even if it had been proven that the emergency room
physician was negligent, the Hipwells failed to prove that the physician was an agent of
the hospital and therefore his negligence would not have resulted in any liability to the
hospital.
However, courts throughout the country have held hospitals liable for the
negligence of the emergency room physicians they employ even if those physicians are
independent contractors. Numerous courts have held hospitals vicariously liable under
either ostensible or apparent agency or agency by estoppel theories. See, e.g..
Pourbianskv v. Emery University. 275 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. App. 1981): Paintsville Hospital
v. Rose. 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ken. 1985); Mehlman v. Powell. 378 A.2d 1121 (Mary. 1977);
Seneris v. Haas. 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955).
For example, in Paintsville Hospital, supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed summary judgment in favor of the hospital for the negligence of an emergency
room physician on the basis of an ostensible agency theory, observing:
The landmark case applying the principle of ostensible agency
to physicians not employed by the hospital but furnished through
the institutional processes is Seneris v. Haas . . ., where it was
applied to an anesthesiologist. Since then, few courts have failed
to recognize the soundness of this application, and the concept has
been generally applied not only to anesthesiologists, but to
pathologists, radiologists, and emergency room physicians, all of
whom share the common characteristic of being supplied through
the hospital rather than being selected by the patient....
As stated by the Superior Court of New Jersey in discussing the
public's reasonable expectation of emergency room physicians . . . :
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"People who seek medical help through the emergency room
facilities of modern-day hospitals are unaware of the status of the
various professionals working there."
In these circumstances it is unreasonable to put a duty on the
patient to inquire of each person who treats him whether he is an
employer or independent contractor of the hospital. Indeed, it
would be astonishing for courts to require a patient to ask the
emergency room personnel such a question considering the usual
circumstances of the patient at the time he seeks out the emergency
room for treatment.
"Absent notice to the contrary, therefore, plaintiff had the right to
assume that the treatment received was being rendered through
hospital employees and that any negligence associated with that
treatment would render the hospital responsible." [683 S.W.2d at
256-258] [Citations Omitted]
Other courts have held the hospitals liable on the basis they have a nondelegible duty to provide emergency room service. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power. 743 P.2d
1376 (Alas. 1987); Irving v. Doctors Hospital. 415 So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1982); Martell v.
St. Charles Hospital. 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1987); Simmons v. Tuomev Regional Medical
Center. 533 S.E.2d 312 (S.Car. 2000). But see. Babtist Memorial Hospital v. Sampson.
969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998); Kelly v. St. Luke Hospital. 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. App.
1992).
Finally, Dr. Healy argues that even if the emergency room was negligent that
would not affect the verdict in his favor because Dr. Healy was not made aware of the
emergency room visit and did not play a role in the emergency room treatment. This
argument should be rejected for two reasons.
First, as argued in Appellants' Brief, the district court's dismissal of the
emergency room malpractice claim and instruction to the jury that the emergency room
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was not negligence could well have affected their determination that Dr. Healy was not
negligent in his subsequent treatment of Shelly. The jury could have believed that the
emergency room negligence was more egregious than anything that Dr. Healy did or
failed to do, and therefore if the emergency room was not negligent, neither was Dr.
Healy.
Second the district court improperly excluded the fraudulent concealment
evidence. If the jury had been permitted to hear that evidence, the jury may well have
found not credible Dr. Healy's testimony that he was not notified of the emergency room
visit and found that given his knowledge of that visit it was negligent for him not to
immediately deliver Shelly.5
The Hipwells should be permitted to present Dr. DeVore's entire testimony
concerning the emergency room negligence to the jury and then let the jury decide
whether the emergency room was negligent.

E. THE HIPWELLS HAVE MET THEIR BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING HARMFUL ERROR.
Dr. Healy wrongly argues that the Hipwells have failed to meet their burden
of showing that the errors committed by the district court were harmful because the jury

5

In this regard, the emergency room physician made a note to follow up with Dr. Healy
"F/U Dr. Healy". [R. 5004 at pp. 405-406] The jury may have concluded that the emergency
room did follow up with Dr. Healy, but he failed to take appropriate action.
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would have reached the same result even if the fraudulent concealment evidence and Dr.
DeVore's testimony had been admitted. This contention is, of course, pure speculation.
As stated earlier, all the Hipwells are required to demonstrate is "absent the error there is
a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to" the Hipwells. State v. Dunn.
supra.
To attempt to convince the court that the errors were not harmful, Dr. Healy
recites the evidence favorable to his position and ignores the fraudulent concealment
evidence and Dr. DeVore's testimony. It is hardly fair to argue that the result would have
been the same without fairly discussing the evidence the jury would have had before it to
support the Hipwells' case.
In this regard, Dr. Healy and IHC repeatedly attempt to denigrate Dr.
DeVore's credentials and expertise while arguing that all the Hipwells had was Dr.
DeVore versus all of their supposed "nationally renowned" experts as if the battle goes to
the side which has the most money to parade the most experts into court. Fortunately,
that is not the case because a medical malpractice plaintiff can rarely match the vast
resources and contacts of the hospitals, the physicians and their insurance companies.
The denigration of Dr. DeVore is also strategic. Certainly IHC thought highly
enough of Dr. DeVore to make him Corporate Director of Maternal Fetal Medicine for
high risk obstetrics responsible for supervising the obstetrical operations of IHC and to
have him travel throughout the IHC system training its emergency room physicians and
staff on the care of third trimester obstetric patients such as Shelly. Dr. Healy also
24

thought highly enough of Dr. DeVore to refer Shelly to him when complications arose in
her pregnancy.
If the jury knew that Dr. Healy and IHC fraudulently concealed their
negligence and had been permitted to hear Dr. DeVore's full testimony concerning
Shelly's care in the emergency room and his opinion that the emergency room breached
the standard of care in its treatment of Shelly, there is certainly a reasonable likelihood
that the jury would have found in the Hipwells' favor.6
With respect to the specific issues on which Dr. Healy claims the jury could
not reasonably have found in the Hipwells' favor even had all the evidence been before it,
Dr. DeVore's testimony was an ample basis upon which the jury could have ruled for the
Hipwells:
1. Earlier Delivery.
Dr. DeVore testified that when Shelly went to the emergency room early on
the morning of December 12, 1988, she was suffering from preeclampsia, that the
standard of care required the emergency room physician to immediately have her treated
by an obstetrician and that Shelly should have been delivered at that time. Dr. DeVore

6

It is noteworthy that Dr. Healy and IHC did not even attempt to obtain summary
judgment on the basis that no reasonable jury could have determined that they were negligent in
their treatment of Shelly, which is essentially what they are now arguing.
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testified that had Shelly been delivered at that time the later severe complications she
suffered would have been avoided. [See Appellants Brief, SOF Nos. 2 - 7]7
Dr. Healy argues that Dr. DeVore did not diagnosis HELLP Syndrome or
preeclampsia when he saw Shelly on December 13. Dr. Healy neglects to tell the court
that all Dr. DeVore was asked to do at that time is to evaluate the fetus, which he did, and
recommended that Shelly be immediately delivered. [R. 5004 at pp. 430-431]
2. The Liver Rupture.
Dr. DeVore testified that Shelly had elevated blood pressure, low platlats and
spontaneous bleeding under the skin following delivery. At approximately 10:30 A.M.
on the morning of December 14, 1988, Shelly had a hypotensive crisis involving
plummeting blood pressure, rapid heart rate and other physical signs and symptoms
indicating that she was in shock due to loss of blood. At that time, she was admitted to
the McKay-Dee intensive care unit where her care was co-managed by Dr. Baughman,
the Director of the ICU, and Dr. Healy. Shelly's abdomen was distended upon arrival at
the ICU and continued to become more distended during the next seven hours there. Dr.
Baughman recognized that internal bleeding was a likely cause of this distension. The

7

Dr. Healy tells the court that "Dr. DeVore did not himself use the definition of
hypertension he was advancing and relying upon at trial." That claim is incorrect. In fact, Dr.
DeVore testified that the definition of hypertension includes a blood pressure rise of either 30 on
the systolic or 15 on the diastolic or 15 from baseline. [R. 5004 at pp. 329-333 and 407-412] Dr.
DeVore testified that when Shelly arrived at the emergency room she had hypertension and
protein in her urine thereby qualifying for a diagnosis of preeclampsia. She also had epigastric
pain which meant that she had severe preeclampsia. [R. 5006 at pp, 810-812]
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ICU called Dr. Healy and told him that Shelly was "crashing". In other words, Shelly
was dying. Dr. DeVore testified that in his opinion Shelly's liver ruptured on the
morning of December 14, which was the cause of the hypotensive crisis that occurred at
that time. Dr. DeVore testified that Shelly's ruptured liver should have been repaired at
that time. [Appellants' Brief, SOF No. 8; R. 5004 at pp. 470-474; 478-479; and 491-509]
Dr. Healy once again criticizes Dr. DeVore's credentials on the basis that he
has never operated on a liver and was not board certified in critical/intensive care or
internal medicine. Judge Iwasaki correctly overruled the attempts of Dr. Healy and IHC
to exclude Dr. DeVore's opinion of when the liver rupture occurred on these grounds. [R.
5004 at pp. 474-477]
3. The Transfer,
Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman were concerned that Shelly would die and that
her abdominal caesarean section wound may have been developing necrotizing fasciitis.
The appropriate treatment for that condition was surgical removal of the tissue in the area
of concern and antibiotics. On December 21, 1998, Dr. Alder conducted a surgical
debridement of the tissue in the area of Shelly's abdominal wound and she was followed
with antibiotics. Dr. Alder did not believe that Shelly had necrotizing fasciitis and so
advised Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman. The McKay-Dee pathology report on the tissue
removed by Dr. Alder indicated that Shelly did not have the lethal form of necrotizing
fasciitis about which Dr. Baughman was allegedly concerned. Dr. Alder's followup
examinations on December 22 and December 23, 1988, revealed that Shelly's abdominal
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wound was "healthy appearing" and was improving. [Appellants' Brief, SOF Nos. 11 and
12] Notwithstanding these facts, and the fact that the McKay-Dee ICU was capable of
treating Shelly's critical illness, Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman had Shelly transferred, via
helicopter, in a critically ill state and on a ventilator, to the University Hospital on
December 23, 1988. [Appellants' Brief, SOF No. 13]
Dr. DeVore testified there is no reason to transfer to Shelly to the University
Hospital and that the transfer was a breach of the standard of care. [R. 5005 at pp. 584608 and 636-637]
The Hipwells clearly met their burden of demonstrating harmful error.

F. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR THE
HIPWELLS5 CLAIMS AGAINST IHC,
Finally, IHC makes the strained argument that despite the fact that the jury
determined in the statute of limitations trial that the statute of limitations did not bar the
Hipwells' claims against Dr. Healy or IHC, nevertheless the statute of limitations does
bar the claims against IHC because the Hipwells did not prove in the statute of limitations
trial that Dr. Healy was an agent of, or in privity with, IHC as required by this court's
decision in Jensen. [IHC Brief, pp. 30-36] This argument is without any merit
whatsoever.
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In Jensen, this court held that Dr. Healy's fraudulent concealment of
malpractice would not serve to toll the statute of limitations against IHC unless an agency
or privity relationship existed between Dr. Healy and IHC. [944 P.2d at 338]
After the remand in Jensen, this court decided Day v. Meek, 976 P.2d 1202
(Utah 1999). In Day v. Meek, this court clarified that fraudulent concealment only comes
into play after the four-year repose period provided by §78-14-4(1) of the Utah Medical
Malpractice Act statute of limitations has expired.
In Day, this court stated that the same analysis applied with respect to the
applicability of the exceptions contained in §§ (a) [the foreign object exception] and (b)
[the fraudulent concealment exception] of §78-14-4(1) within the 4-year period of repose.
The court opined:
The one-year limitation on cases involving fraudulent concealment
makes sense only if it comes into play after the expiration of the
four-year repose period, which would otherwise cut off all causes
of action.
Day concluded:
In sum, we hold that Utah Code Ann., §78-14-4(l)(a), applies
only to claims brought after the four-year repose period and does
not negate or supplant the operation of the two-year general statute
of limitations prior to expiration of the repose period.
Because the Day court determined that the same analysis was applicable to §§ (b)
fraudulent concealment cases, it is plain under Day that fraudulent concealment is only
applicable to the statute of limitations after the expiration of the four-year repose period.
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Relying on Day v. Meek. Dr. Healy and IHC filed below a joint motion for a
special verdict form, specifically arguing that based on this court's ruling in Day, the
fraudulent concealment exception no longer had any application to this case because
"[t]his is clearly not a case where the four-year period lapsed." [R. 1919, 1926] A
heading of a section of their memorandum in support of Defendants' Joint Motion for
Approval of Special Verdict Form reads:
THE VERY RECENT OPINION IN DAY v. MEEK CLARIFIES
THAT THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT EXCEPTION TO
§78-14-4 ONLY APPLIES TO CASES WHERE THE FOURYEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE HAS PASSED. [R. 1925]
IHC and Dr. Healy further told Judge Iwasaki in their memorandum:
In interpreting the scope of the foreign object exception, the
Court expressly noted that it would necessarily also be deciding the
scope of the parallel fraudulent concealment exception to
§78-14-4. The Court concluded that the foreign body exception
and the fraudulent concealment exception applied only after the
four-year repose period has run.
This is clearly not a case where the four-year period lapsed.
The issue is when the plaintiffs, through their counsel, Simon
Forgette, discovered the legal injury, thus commencing the twoyear statute of limitations. The fraudulent concealment exception
has no application under the plain ruling in Day. [R. 1926]
Dr. Healy and IHC accordingly requested that the special verdict form read:
Would a reasonable attorney, presented with the facts that attorney
Forgette knew [prior to] December 16, 1999 have considered
investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr. Healy and
McKay-Dee?
Dr. Healy and IHC told the court:
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If the jury answers ctyes"> judgment must be entered in favor of
defendants. If the jury answers "no", the statute of limitations
defense will have failed and the case will proceed to trial on the
medical negligence claims. [R. 1926, 1927] [Emphasis Added]
This special verdict question did not require the jury to determine agency or privity.
The Hipwells agreed that the fraudulent concealment exception was no longer
applicable to this case. [R. 2049] The Hipwells took the position that acts of concealment
would be put in evidence not to prove fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of
limitations but as simply part of the facts and circumstances that the jury would consider
in determining when plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, their cause of
action for medical negligence. [R. 2049] The Hipwells proposed the following special
interrogatory which was adopted by Judge Iwasaki:
Prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney Forgette discover or
under the circumstances is it reasonable that he should have
discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell by Dr. Healy
and McKay-Dee Hospital. [R. 1981 and 2015]
Judge Iwasaki used the verdict form proposed by the Hipwells. The jury
found for the Hipwells. [R. 2423] The Defendants did not except to the verdict form, nor
did the Defendants' subsequent Joint Motion for JNOV/New Trial argue that the verdict
form should have contained language regarding Dr. Healy's agency or privity with IHC.
[R. 2515-2561]
Based upon Day v. Meek. Judge Iwasaki excluded any evidence of privity or
agency from trial. [R. 2277-2279] And, Dr. Healy and IHC successfully moved to
exclude any evidence of the fraudulent concealment. [R. 2278; R. 4997 at pp. 4-9]
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IHC now contradicts its argument to Judge Iwasaki by insisting that Day did
not rule that the statute of limitations exception is only relevant if the four-year statute of
repose has expired. [IHC Brief, pp. 35-36] This argument not only contradicts IHC's
argument in the district court which was conceded by the Hipwells and accepted by Judge
Iwasaki as demonstrated above, but is also plainly wrong.
IHC argues that Day only dealt with whether the one-year exception for
discovery of foreign objects applied to a claim brought shortly after the expiration of that
one-year period or whether the general two-year after discovery provision applied. The
language of Day quoted above adequately disposes of this argument. IHC also argues
that Jensen applied common law principles of fraudulent concealment to toll the general
two-year provision and not fraudulent concealment under §78-14-4(l)(b). However, that
statute does not contain any special definition of fraudulent concealment. The fraudulent
concealment referred to in the statute is common law fraudulent concealment. The statute
simply extends the statute of limitations if common law fraudulent concealment is
proven.
IHC claims that the law of the case doctrine applies to preclude the Hipwells
from arguing that fraudulent concealment - - and thus the issues of privity and agency - is not necessary to toll the statute of limitations in this case after Day. IHC ignores the
well recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine that the doctrine will generally
not be enforced where there has been an intervening change of controlling authority. See.
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e.g.. Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah. 31 P.3d 543, 546 (Utah 2001); Red
Flame. Inc. v. Martinez. 996 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah 2000).
After Day, the evidence of the coverup was only relevant insofar as the statute
of limitations was concerned to the extent that the evidence bore on the issue of what
Simon Forgette (and thus the Hipwells) knew, or should have known, concerning possible
claims against Dr. Healy and IHC as of December 16,1989.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Judgment
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
DATED this / ^ d a y of May, 2002.
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